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Our thesis in this paper is that, in order to appreciate the interplay between cognitive
(goal-directed) and physical performance in tool use, it is necessary to determine the role
that representations play in the use of tools.We argue that rather being solely a matter of
internal (mental) representation, tool use makes use of the external representations that
deﬁne the human–environment–tool–object system.This requires the notion of Distributed
Cognition to encompass not simply the manner in which artifacts represent concepts but
also how they represent praxis. Our argument is that this can be extended to include how
artifacts-in-context afford use and how this response to affordances constitutes a particular
form of skilled performance. By artifacts-in-context, we do not mean solely the affordances
offered by the physical dimensions of a tool but also the interaction between the tool and
the object that it is being used on. From this, “affordance” does not simply relate to the
physical appearance of the tool but anticipates subsequent actions by the user directed
towards the goal of changing the state of the object and this is best understood in terms
of the “complimentarity” in the system. This assertion raises two challenges which are
explored in this paper. The ﬁrst is to distinguish “affordance” from the adaptation that one
might expect to see in descriptions of motor control; when we speak of “affordance” as
a form of anticipation, don’t we just mean the ability to adjust movements in response
to physical demands? The second is to distinguish “affordance” from a schema of the
tool; when we talk about anticipation, don’t we just mean the ability to call on a schema
representing a “recipe” for using that tool for that task? This question of representation,
speciﬁcally what knowledge needs to be represented in tool use, is central to this
paper.
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INTRODUCTION
The central question for this paper is what representations are
employed when using tools? In this paper, the term “representa-
tion” is taken to mean a set of parameters which describe an action
(from goal to execution). In broad terms, one answer to this ques-
tion might see the set of parameters as being speciﬁed prior to an
action being performed, e.g., in the form of an action schema, or
as being recruited in preparation of the action, e.g., in the form
of activation of speciﬁc brain regions. In this case, the question
becomes one of identifying what the representation might contain
and where it might be stored. This is what we refer to as an “inter-
nal representation.”Alternatively, the parameters might arise from
the performance of the action in response to constraints imposed
by the environment, e.g., in the dynamic behavior of a system.
This is what we refer to as an “external representation.” We argue
that, while there is evidence to support the view that tool use can
be guided by “internal representation,” this only provides a partial
view of such activity and that the use of “external representation”
can provide a viable alternative account.
The position taken in this paper assumes that the physical
behavior of the person can be viewed as part and parcel of their
cognitive activity, and that there is a close coupling between a
person’s action and their perception of features of objects in the
world. However, neither assumption fully captures human activ-
ity when using physical objects for goal-directed activity (which
is the broad deﬁnition of tool-use employed in this paper). Thus,
we argue for a broader appreciation of Gibson’s (1979) notion of
complimentarity as an explanation of affordance at a“system”level.
The notion of “system” here draws on Maravita and Iriki’s (2004)
idea of the “hand-tool body schema” but we extend this to cover
person–environment–tool–object. For us, this requires the notion
of Distributed Cognition to encompass not simply the manner
in which artifacts represent concepts but also how they represent
praxis. In other words, the design of the tool (as a human-made
artifact) reﬂects not only the manufacturing process but also a set
of assumptions about how that tool should be grasped and manip-
ulated, and how activities involving that tool can be performed
“correctly.” This means that “tools” are distinct from other physi-
cal objects in the human environment because their use is deﬁned
not only by their appearance or the user’s goals but also by cultural
constraints that have inﬂuenced their production (Baber, 2003,
2006; Burghardt et al., 2011). While there are instances in which
other physical objects, such as sticks or stones, can fulﬁl tool func-
tions, and while the neurological evidence suggests that images
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of these objects activate similar regions in the brain to images of
tools, there is accumulating evidence that the pattern of brain acti-
vation for tools is somewhat different from that of physical objects
per se.
“Human beings, viewed as behaving systems, are quite simple. The appar-
ent complexity of our behaviour over time is largely a reﬂection of the
environment in which we ﬁnd ourselves” [Simon, 1969]
While Simon was not talking explicitly about Distributed Cog-
nition, this quotation points to the need to understand human
behavior in the environment in which it occurs. For us this
implies a need to better understand how the environment makes
an impact on our actions and decisions, and this suggests the ben-
eﬁt of an approach which studies human action as they occur
in natural (or as near natural as possible) conditions. This raises
challenges for “ecological validity” (Neisser, 1967) which takes us
out of the laboratory (or, for that matter, the brain scanner) and
into the settings in which activity is performed. A primary rea-
son for this quest is the assumption that the relations between
human, environment, tool, and object are fundamental to the
study of perception and action (Gibson, 1979; Beek and Bing-
ham, 1991; Newell, 1991). A study of the activities of tool use
away from typical environments runs the risk of ignoring the con-
straints that the environment places on the performance of these
activities. Thus, it is vital to ensure that enough of the character-
istics of the person–environment–tool–object system are reﬂected
in the design of studies (even if these are conducted in labora-
tories). We are interested in ways in which we might be able
to capture data from the tool using actions of people in work
environments, through analyzing video of their activity (and dis-
cussing these videos with them) or through putting sensors on
the tools that they use. For this paper, the focus will be on the
use of data collected from sensors on tools. Two areas of activ-
ity will be used in this paper: using hand-tools in jewelery and
eating with cutlery. In both areas, the concern will be to com-
pare experienced and less experienced users of the tools. The
comparison will be qualitative rather than quantitative, i.e., exam-
ples of the data collected during our studies will be presented
but more detailed analyses of these data will be found in other
papers.
WHAT NEEDS TO BE REPRESENTED IN TOOL USE?
By way of a deﬁnition of the word “tool,” we propose that a
tool is a physical object which lends itself to manipulation by
a human (or animal) in order to solve a problem presented by
objects in the physical environment. This notion of tool-use as a
form of problem-solving not only emphasizes the goal-directed
aspect of using tools but also the need to respond to, and over-
come, constraints. This deﬁnition allows us to combine both the
physical action of manipulating the tool with the cognitive aspects
of goal-directed, purposeful behavior. Following a similar line of
argument (tool use as problem solving), Osiurak et al. (2010) sug-
gest that the coordination of the physical actions involved in using
tools represent a problem to be solved. They view cognition and
physical activity in a dialectic in which a particular goal encour-
ages the perception of particular affordances in the world and
serves to inﬂuence the bodily action to perform, which, in turn,
moves the person towards their goal. This strikes us as an ele-
gant reformulation of the notion of affordance as a goal-directed,
physical response to the environment. The difference between this
view and the one presented in this paper is simply (we believe)
a matter of scale: rather than considering problem solving in the
broad terms that Osiurak et al. (2010) offer, our focus is on the
interface between tool and object (or, rather, we propose that the
“problem” that concerns tool users is how to modify the object in
ways that satisﬁes a goal, given the constraints that the tool (and
the tool-users’ ability to wield that tool) might impose on their
action).
In order to explore further the question of representation in
tool use, it is important to consider what needs to be represented
in order to use a tool. Tool use is not only a matter of recog-
nizing that an object is a tool but also of knowing how to hold
and manipulate that particular tool. It is also a matter of under-
standing the consequences of a particular way of using a particular
tool. Knowing that a piercing saw (used by jewelers to cut metals)
is held vertically for cutting (with the wrist more or less locked
and most of the motion about the elbow), and has teeth which
cut in one direction, leads to an understanding that the cut is
made on the downstroke (not the upstroke), and helps deﬁne a
set of possible actions when using this tool. From this it might
appear that we are arguing for (at least) some representations
of the tool and the actions associated to be internal to the per-
son. Does this mean that these representations are stored in the
brain?
INTERNAL REPRESENTATION: NEURAL ACTIVATION IN TOOL
USE
The suggestion that the use of tools depends on “internal models”
is nicely encapsulated in a recent paper by Imamizu and Kawato
(2012). They review literature and report studies which indicate
the existence of both a feed-forward model, taking efference copies
of motor commands to enablemotiondynamics, and inversemod-
els used to manage these dynamics. During learning, changes in
cerebellar activity indicate the acquisition and reﬁnement of such
models. As we argue in this paper, the notion that brain-based
“internal models” are causal represents a particular view of tool
use, and we are proposing that it is possible to explain much of
the activity involved in tool use through a combination of Dis-
tributed Cognition and dynamics which might not be represented
in the brain per se. However, before exploring this proposal further,
we consider some of the neuropsychological evidence relating to
tool use. Imamizu and Kawato (2012) review neuropsychological
studies of tool use and suggest that, “[A]lthough the brain regions
related to each type of component cannot be uniquely determined. . .”
(p. 325) there are two distinct functional regions of the brain
related to tool use: one related to the physical skills involved in
dextrous tool manipulation, and one related to the semantic and
conceptual knowledge relating to the functions of tools (see also
Lewis, 2006; Higuchi et al., 2007, 2009). These distinct regions are
discussed in more detail in the rest of this section.
In their now classic study, Chao and Martin (2000) used func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to show that viewing
and naming of tools led to activation of the left ventral premotor
cortex, suggesting a strong relationship between the physical
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appearance of objects and the fact these objects could be acted
upon. Grafton et al. (1997) used positron emission tomography
(PET) scanning of participants asked to observe or (silently) name
tools and their use. Observation of tools resulted in strong acti-
vation of the left dorsal premotor cortex, and (silent) naming of
these tools resulted in additional activation of Broca’s area. How-
ever, naming the use of the tools led to activation in Broca’s area,
together with activation in left dorsal premotor cortex, left ven-
tral premotor cortex, and left supplementary motor area. This
implies that naming the use of a tool (even when the action is
not performed with it) has motor valence which is additional to
that obtained when looking at the tool. It also suggests that the
physical appearance and name of a tool activates slightly different
areas than the use of the tool. Taken together these, and related,
studies imply that brain activation relates to speciﬁc properties
of the tool-as-form and tool-as-function, and that these proper-
ties are not solely related to a tool’s physical appearance but also
to how it moves or how it is used (Johnson-Frey, 2004; Martin,
2007).
One suggestion is that representations of tools are held in spe-
ciﬁc regions of the brain and become activated during activities in
which similar objects are used. According to Gallivan et al. (2013)
the distributed coding of different actions associated with hand
movement and tool use imply that these actions are represented
separately and then integrated in the frontoparietal cortex. As Yee
et al. (2013) show, in an ingenious experiment, asking people to
think about manipulable objects when they are performing man-
ual actions which are incompatible with those objects is difﬁcult
(but it easy to think about non-manipulable objects during the
performance of such actions). This suggests that the meaning of
objects (speciﬁcally in terms of their properties which support
manipulation) is recruited during action, and that incompatible
action interferes with this. Furthermore, work by Hoeren et al.
(2013) points to the suggestion that the recognition of action
(performed by other people) is processed using distinct streams:
the dorso-dorsal stream focusing on movement determined by
the properties of the objects being used, and the dorso-ventral
stream focusing on functional appropriateness and dexterity of
task performance.
KNOWLEDGE OF (FAMILIAR) TOOL USE
The discussion so far points to the need to draw on knowledge of
the appropriateness of a given tool for a given task andhow towield
that tool to achieve the most effective result. Riddoch et al. (2006)
presented patients (manifesting visual extinction) with images of
pairs of objects. The pairs showed objects which people are likely
to have experienced being used together (e.g., a bottle and a glass),
or objects which could plausibly be used together, although might
not have been experienced as such (e.g., a bottle and a bucket),
or were randomly paired in order to, as far as possible, produce
pairs which had no association. The results showed that com-
monly paired objects were identiﬁed more quickly than plausibly
paired objects which, in turn, were identiﬁed more quickly than
the randomly paired objects (although this latter ﬁnding only held
when the image showed the objects being used together rather
than having them presented side by side). One implication of this
work (which could be applied to normals as well as patients) is that
the common and plausible pairs activate familiar routines in tool
use. In contrast with this observation, Vingerhoets (2008) found
that presentation of images of “familiar”or“unfamiliar” tools acti-
vated the same brain regions, with “unfamiliar” tools generating
more activation in the left hemispheric medial posterior occipi-
tal and inferior posterior temporal areas (in comparison to images
of “familiar” tools) and more activation around the supramarginal
gyrus for the familiar tools.While these results showed strong indi-
vidual differences, they also imply that the activation in response
to “familiar” tools can be associated with knowledge of the appro-
priate hand position for the use of the tool (as opposed to simply
whether or not the tool could be grasped).
A similar line of argument comes from studies in which par-
ticipants are asked to pick up handled objects (such as cups)
when the handle faces either towards or away from the hand
that they are instructed to use (Tucker and Ellis, 2001). For
example, Bub et al. (2012) presented images of everyday objects
together with images of hands in different orientations. The
objects all had handles which were either oriented horizontally,
e.g., pliers, frying pan, or vertically, e.g., beer mug, hairdryer.
Participants were asked to name the object. Reaction (naming)
time was signiﬁcantly faster when both hand and wrist orien-
tation matched the type of handle, or when neither hand and
wrist orientation matched the handle, but much slower when
either hand or wrist orientation was incongruent. Relating this
to the previous discussion of neural imaging, one can assume that
the photographs of the hands and the objects might have acti-
vated different regions, with a combination occurring prior to
response.
The suggestion that there might be preparative neural activ-
ity which corresponds to different types of action (Rizzolatti
et al., 1988) could provide evidence for the recruitment of a
set of representations determining task performance. Certainly
the movement-related cortical potential (MRCP) recorded from
electroencephalography (EEG) begins 2–3 s before the onset
of movement (Toma and Hallett, 2003; Wheaton et al., 2005).
Furthermore, onset seems to be proportional to complexity of
movement, with more complex movements having longer onset
times. Such activity, typically in the left posterior parietal cor-
tex, is taken to indicate the need to manage complex motor
activity and, as Wheaton et al. (2005) propose may include
“. . .imagining executing such movements; the goal of the move-
ment; determining the natural position and setting required for
proper performance; sequence of motor acts and comprehension of
the task.” (p. 535). While we have every reason to accept that
complex movements involve recruitment of appropriate muscle
groupings and speciﬁcation of appropriate control parameters,
we do not see why this necessarily involves the deﬁnition of
speciﬁc representations of the task context. Thus, our debate is
not with the neurological evidence per se but with the assump-
tions that these must point to internal representations which drive
behavior.
What is interesting in the Bub et al. (2012) study is less the
reinforcing of activation of congruent images (or, indeed, the
effect of incongruence) than the problems caused when one of
the hand images did not match the other image or the object.
Bub et al. (2012) suggest that this reﬂected disruption of the plan
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being developed in working memory (with the images activat-
ing particular judgments about using tools). However, the images
presented in these studies serve as the (external) representations
about which people are asked to make judgments. As such the
idea that they would need to create corresponding internal rep-
resentations in order to make such judgments seems a little odd.
The images that are presented provided sufﬁcient information to
make a judgment and the need is to determine whether these
are “true” or “possible.” On the one hand, it seems plausible to
assume that prior experience provides the “grounding” (Mizelle
and Wheaton, 2010) of a tool in terms of its usage, but on the
other hand, it is equally plausible that this could be part of the per-
son’s action repertoire (e.g., in terms of Bernstein’s (1967) idea of
coordinative structures) as it is activation of speciﬁc regions of the
brain.
For an action in which participants had to use different tools
to touch a target, precuing the target had no beneﬁt on per-
formance, but precuing the tool to use had signiﬁcant beneﬁts
(Massen and Prinz, 2007). We take this to suggest that the pre-
cuing of the tool enabled the recruitment of the appropriate
“coordinative structure,” to use Bernstein’s (1967) phrase describ-
ing combinations of muscle enervation and limb movement, to
perform the task with a given tool. What is interesting about
this interpretation of their ﬁndings is that “representation” need
not be same for different tasks (and, we would argue, shows
how it can shift to outside the brain per se). Hermsdörfer et al.
(2006) compared performance of apraxic patients with a con-
trol group of normals on a sawing task. Participants were asked
to demonstrate sawing under three conditions: when they were
shown a photograph of a saw and asked to pantomime saw-
ing; when they were shown the photograph, given a piece of
wood (the same size as the saw’s handle) to hold and asked
to pantomime sawing; when they were given the actual saw to
hold. While the controls showed fairly consistent performance
across the three conditions, apraxic patients showed motion
errors (deduced from 3D motion tracking) in the ﬁrst two con-
ditions. Typically, these errors involved substituting mediolateral
motion for the anteposterial motion expected. Interestingly, these
errors were not apparent when the apraxic patients were given
the actual saw to use. On the one hand, this supports a com-
mon ﬁnding in apraxic studies (that providing people with the
physical object seems to enable them to perform tasks more
effectively and reliably than when they do not have the object
to hand). On the other hand, we believe it tells us something
about the need for internal representation when using tools.
Hermsdörfer et al. (2006) conclude that “. . . pantomiming the
use of a tool and actually using the tool are facilitated by largely
different neural processes which differ in demands and goals.”
[p. 1651]. We would argue further that these differences arise
because the use of the tool involves the control of the person–
environment–tool–object system and need not depend on internal
representation.
CONCLUSION
Just because the tool-using behaviors have neural correlates does
not mean that these are the only places in which representations
for the behaviors exist. Clearly, the type of grasp is likely to be
inﬂuenced by the action which one intends to perform with the
tool. We have a repertoire of appropriate grasps for manipula-
ble objects, and we adapt these grasps according to contextual
demands. The adaptation often occurs with sufﬁcient ﬂuency and
speed to make it unlikely that we have simply retrieved a particular
piece of “motor schema” from memory and applied this; indeed,
the very notion of a “motor schema” (with its attendant implica-
tion of stored sequences of action) has been called into question
(Sherwood and Lee, 2003; Shea and Wulf, 2005). Thus, we argue
the tool user is, partly, using the tool to make changes to objects in
the environment, but also partly using the tool to help create fur-
ther opportunities in the environment for using the tool. In other
words, tool use is an interplay between seeking a deﬁned goal and
managing the affordances arising from changes in the object in the
environment (resulting from the ongoing use of tools). Before dis-
cussing the collection of data and their analysis, the next section
describes the particular stance taken in this paper: Distributed
Cognition.
EXTERNAL REPRESENTATION: DISTRIBUTED COGNITION
AND THE EXTENDED MIND
As the phrase implies, Distributed Cognition addresses situa-
tions in which the processing of information occurs outside the
brain. For some writers, this is the proposal that the environment
and the objects it contains can shape the way in which cogni-
tion is performed (Zhang and Norman, 1994; Hutchins, 1995a,b;
Scaife and Rogers, 1996). While this position could be seen as
paraphrasing the well-known observation that the representation
of a problem space inﬂuences the strategy that problem solvers
apply (Chase and Simon, 1973; Larkin et al., 1980; Chi et al.,
1981), e.g., changing the layout of a puzzle can make it easier
or harder to solve, it also points to the importance of interactiv-
ity in behavior. For example, people playing Tetris or Scrabble
can beneﬁt (in some situations) by being allowed to manipu-
late and rearrange the playing pieces (Kirsh and Maglio, 1994;
Maglio et al., 1999). This points to the need to not simply focus
on the arrangement and design of the problem representation, but
also on the nature of the interaction between person and objects.
From this point of view, “embodiment” becomes an essential fea-
ture of acting not only on the objects but also on the cognitive
tasks involved in problem solving. In other words, rearranging
the pieces is not simply performed in order to assist thinking, it
is thinking. This is taken to mean that the relationships within
the human–environment–tool–object system not only supports
(or affords) different actions but also shapes cognition (Wilson,
2002). The reason for this is that activity within this system is
often time-limited, in that the actions are performed at speed, in
real-time and offer little opportunity for planning (what Clark,
1997, has termed “mind on the hoof”). From this, the main
purpose of cognition (in tool use) is to support action in as
situation-appropriate manner as possible. It also suggests that,
rather than needing to construct “internal representations” of
the environment, it is sufﬁcient to respond to the appearance
of the environment. From his work with robots, Brooks (1990)
pointed out that robot performance could be more efﬁcient if they
spent less time “planning” and creating representations, and more
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time “acting” because “the world is its own best model” [Brooks,
1990, 12].
CONSIDERING AFFORDANCE
Our reading of Gibson’s (1977, 1979) concept of affordance lies in
his notion of “complimentarity” in which the properties of objects
in the environment are responded to by the animal. Turvey (1992)
offers the term“effectivity”as awayof capturing these properties of
the animal. So, oneway of seeing affordance lies in the complimen-
tarity between the object’s properties and the animal’s effectivity.
One of the problems that the idea of “effectivity” and “properties”
raises is the suggestion that these are separate aspects which are
brought together during the performance of a task, which implies
that they are independent, autonomous features which become
coupled during task performance. Indeed, Gibson (1979) suggests
that the “affordance” exists whether or not the observer perceives
or attends to it. If this is the case, then it makes sense to assume
that one aspect of the “effectivity” of the task performer would be
the neural representations of the actions involved in performing
the task (as well as morphological features and motor skills).
There are many situations in which the observer cannot but
attend to the affordance, e.g., perseveration in the behavior of
stroke patients, or response to “fake” cues by animals. Rather than
implying (as Gibson seems to) that the“affordance” is an invariant
property of the environment, the fact that perseveration is an
unusual state of affairs suggests that humans (and some animals)
are able to choose to respond to affordances (and by implication,
to see affordances in different situations). This implies that what
is essential to “affordance” is this combination of the property of
the object in the environment and the effectivity of the speciﬁc
individual (with speciﬁc knowledge, skills, abilities, and goals)
in that environment. While the properties of the object in the
environment may well be invariant, the actual affordance arises
from the complimentarity of environment and actor. Affordance is
partly a matter of perception-action coupling and partly a matter
of intention (goal) – action coupling. Perhaps a better way of
putting this is that perception-action coupling is mediated by the
intentionality of the actor. However, as Chemero (2009) points
out, the idea of separable components that can be coupled runs
counter to the notion of complimentarity; taking affordance as the
result of the system created by person–environment–tool–object
(as we do in this paper) leads to the conclusion that this is a
system which is non-decomposable and which exists only during
the performance of the given task. From this, we suggest that the
goal, in the person–environment–tool–object system is partly held
by the person (in terms of the effect that they intend to produce
on the object) and partly situated (Suchman, 1987) in the ongoing
interactivity in the system. This assumption echoes the earlier
assertion of van Leeuwen et al. (1994) that tool use can be “. . .
deﬁned as performing an action on a target by performing an action
on a tool. The action on the tool is embedded in the action on the
target.” [van Leeuwen et al. (1994), p. 188–189]. For van Leeuwen
et al. (1994) this embedding reﬂected a “higher-order affordance
structure” of “mutually constraining complimentarities.”
van Leeuwen et al. (1994) argued that it was important to
understand the role of context in task performance in terms of a
sufﬁciency principle, i.e., “if an affordance has already been realized,
there is no need to take it into account.” [van Leeuwen et al. (1994),
p. 190]. To take this a little further, Turvey (1992) suggests that
affordance might play a role in “predictive control”of activity and,
while the analysis (and indeed use of the term), in this paper
might differ from his, the idea that affordance refers not only to
immediate action but to future actions is central to the ideas in
this paper. Additionally, Mizelle et al. (2013) discuss the notion
of functional affordance, in which there is an optimal manner in
which a given object can be used to achieve a desired goal. For
example, Mizelle et al. (2013) note that a hammer can be held a
variety of grasps (some involving the handle, some involving the
head, for instance) but that there is a grasp which “. . . best affords
the action of driving a nail. . .” (p. 280). This can be seen as taking
the predictive control further, in that there is a goal state against
action can be optimized. While these notions of affordance could
be represented internally (in terms of speciﬁc neural correlates of
functional affordance that can be adapted to contextual demands),
the notion of complimentarity followed in this paper offers a more
parsimonious explanation. In other words, the Gibsonian notion
of affordance is taken in this paper to describe a particular form of
complimentarity in the person–environment–tool–object system,
and it is the “system” as a whole which can be said to optimize the
tool-using activity.
TASKONOMY AND HOW THE ENVIRONMENT AFFORDS SKILLED
ACTION
One way in which the environment can be created to provide
affordances for future action is in the ways in which experts lay
out their workspace. In their discussion of blacksmiths, Keller and
Keller (1996) use the term “taskonomy” to refer to the ways in
which an expert’s knowledge of the tasks to be performed help
create the arrangement (taxonomy) of tools in their space. This
arrangement is not simply a matter of having particular types of
tools kept near each other, but arises through a combination of
tools and actions. A similar pattern can be seen in the workspace
of the jeweler (Figure 1).
As the jeweler performs a particular task, so a tool is picked
up, used and then laid down in the workspace; as work progresses
so tools are either reused or new ones introduced. However, the
expert is often able to describe what work had been completed
in a particular workspace by looking at the collection of tools in
the immediate vicinity. In some cases, specialized tools will be
brought to the workspace with the intention of supporting a par-
ticular goal. Thus, the workspace becomes managed to provide
particular affordances (in terms of available tools and the posi-
tion in which these tools are placed to support particular types
of grasp). This suggests the anticipation of tasks and the arrange-
ment of the workspace in line with these anticipations. In these
ways, the movement of tools in the workspace (as the result of
deliberately selecting these in preparation of a speciﬁc job, or as
the result of picking up and putting down the tools during the
performance of the job, or as the result of moving tools which are
no longer needed further away from the central point of reaching)
becomes part of the structuring of the workspace. Rather than
simply reﬂecting the ebb and ﬂow of actions in the workspace, we
argue that this reﬂects the management of potential affordances
and, as such, is a form of Distributed Cognition. The suggestion
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FIGURE 1 | “Taskonomy” in jewelers’ workspaces.
that moving tools around the workspace is a form of “cognition” is
logically the same as the suggestion that presentation of a problem
will “frame” the approach to the solution and that manipulating
pieces in a puzzle might be a form of thinking. In other words,
layout of the workspace will frame the actions which are most
likely to be performed and this framing is the result of deliber-
ate choices made to retain, discard or move a tool after it has
been used (rather than merely a consequence of moving tools
around).
WORKING WITH TOOLS
In his discussion of craftwork, David Pye draws the useful dis-
tinction between “certainty” and “risk” in craftwork. He argues
that in “the workmanship of certainty” there is an impetus to
design work to ensure consistency, repeatability, and minimize
variation or ambiguity. Such work involves heavily proscribed
procedures and measures of quality and could be interpreted in
terms of industrialized production processes. In this approach,
the artifact being produced will be tightly speciﬁed prior to pro-
duction and the resulting artifact will be considered in terms of
this speciﬁcation. Anyone who has constructed ﬂat-pack or self-
assembly furniture will have encountered a situation in which the
manufacturer has sought to encourage workmanship of certainty.
However, anyone who has built self-assembly furniture will also
recognize the challenges that this poses. Misreading the instruc-
tions or believing that you know what you are doing so don’t
need to read the instructions can lead to results which differ
from the goal. This could be quite minor (a handful of left over
components) or quite major (the door which doesn’t open, the
shelf which drops out when the unit is stood up). This varia-
tion illustrates the workmanship of risk. This, in turn, reﬂects
the variability in outcome which can arise from decisions made
by the worker during the performance of the tasks. The deci-
sions could reﬂect a choice of tool, or knowledge/skill in the
use of the tool, but they could equally reﬂect responses to the
opportunities presented (or constraints created) by the materials
being used. For example, the knot in a piece of wood, or the ﬁn-
ish on one side of the self-assembly wardrobe, could constraint
the actions which are possible or could suggest an appropriate
action to perform. In contrast, the “workmanship of risk” does
not involve such tight speciﬁcation, i.e., “. . . the quality of the
result is not predetermined, but depends on the judgment, dexter-
ity and care which the maker exercises as he works.” (Pye, 1968,
p. 20). Rather than the intent or purpose being predetermined, it
is now something which crystalizes through the developing inter-
action between craftworker, tools, and materials being worked.
This is something which we noted in our study of jewellery mak-
ing (Baber and Saini, 1995): the jeweler worked to very sketchy
“plans” but adapted these plans to suit the resulting state of the
material, often modifying a particular ring or brooch to capital-
ize on a particular facet that they noticed as the metal was being
worked.
“First, the experienced worker usually employs “smoother” and more
consistent movements…Secondly, the experienced worker operates more
rhythmically, indicating that a higher degree of temporal organization
has been achieved. Thirdly, the experienced worker makes better use of the
sensory data. . .Fourthly, the experienced worker reacts in an integrated
way to groups of sensory signals, and makes organized grouped responses
to them” [Seymour, 1972, 35–36]
The quotation from Seymour (1972) indicates how the output
of the human–environment–tool–object system is being opti-
mized, but not necessarily how the dynamics of the system relate
changes in input to output. In order to consider this, we turn
our attention to series of studies conducted by Bril and her col-
leagues, focusing on tasks involving hammering (either stone
hammers to knap ﬂint or metal hammers to shape stone or glass
beads).
SYSTEM DYNAMICS: TRANSFORMATIONS IN TOOL USE
Our actions, when using tools, involve the coordination of a set
of transformations (Biryukova and Bril, 2012). We transform
kinetic energy into tool motion – but need to appreciate how
much energy to exert in order to produce the desired motion
of the tool (and in order to produce the desired effect on the
object from the tool’s motion). We manage dynamic transforma-
tions, balancing the movement of the tool in the air and on the
object with our own motions and with the outcome of the tool’s
activity. We anticipate what effect the tool’s motions will pro-
duce and relate these to the outcomes that we desire. As Ingold
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(2000) points out, “Intentionality and functionality are . . . imma-
nent in the activity itself, in the gestural synergy of human being,
tool and environment.” (Ingold, 2000, p. 352.) The ability to both
anticipate the outcome of the tool’s action and manage the func-
tionality of the tool are an integral part of the use of the tool. The
dynamics of using the tool thus becomes far more important than
might be implied by the neurological imaging work which concen-
trates on the form and function of the tool. Given that these (and
related) transformations need to be managed during the use of
tools, it is worth asking where these transformations might be rep-
resented? If they are “represented” simply during the performance
of an action, and arise from the moment-to-moment correction of
the action, then one might not expect to see anticipatory effects.
On the other hand, if there is evidence of anticipation (of the
consequences of any of these transformations) then this implies
a need to represent the consequence and the question remains,
where does this representation reside and what form does it
take?
Before considering the questions of transformations, it is worth
repeating some of the observations from these studies regarding
expertise. For example, Roux et al. (1995) showed that expert
craftsmen (making stone or glass beads) showed signiﬁcantly
less inter- and intra-individual variations in performance than
less experienced workers. Similarly, Biryukova and Bril (2008)
showed that expert knappers used a larger repertoire of joint angle
combinations than their less qualiﬁed colleagues (who tended to
demonstrate more rigid behavior), and Bril et al. (2010) showed
that experts showed a lower variability in kinetic energy com-
pared to intermediates and novices. In related work, Vernooij
et al. (2012) explored learning in a task involving the use of a
300-g hammer-stone. Analysis of motion tracked during the per-
formance of this task showed inter-individual differences in the
ways in which joint angles were combined to strike a particu-
lar type of blow and that these combinations changed during
the course of the study. The analysis of learning to use such
a hammer suggested that participants were only able to modify
one parameter (relating to joint angles or impact force) but not
both at the same time, until they had gained proﬁciency in the
task.
In a series of experiments comparing expert, intermediate and
novice users of stone hammers (in ﬂint-knapping tasks conducted
in the laboratory), Bril et al. (2010) identify three primary param-
eters that seem to contribute to the dynamics of tool use in this
context. The ﬁrst are Control Parameters, such as the velocity
with which the hammer stone approached the target. The study
showed that, in general, novices appreciated the need to control
velocity but were not able to control this efﬁciently (this ﬁnding is
supported by the work on Vernooij et al., 2012, discussed above).
Thus, we would expect greater variability in the novice perfor-
mance on these control parameters; as Seymour (1972) put it, the
expert actions would be performed in a “smoother,”“more consis-
tent,”“more rhythmical[ly]”manner. The second set of parameters
considered by Bril et al. (2010) are regulatory parameters, such as
the trajectory followed by the hammer stone and the potential
energy applied. Experts tended to show shorter trajectories and
smaller ratios between parameters. In Seymour’s (1972) terms,
this shows how experts are able to use a“higher degree of temporal
organization” and also to make “better use of the sensory data” in
managing their actions. As Bril et al. (2010) note, “In the present
task, the velocity of the hammer had to be controlled to produce the
required kinetic energy in relation to the mass of the hammer. This
was achieved by concurrently changing the trajectory, the amplitude
of the movement, and the muscular force. In this perspective, the
movement became meaningful only in relation to the production of
functional parameters at the level of the task, which allowed formove-
ment ﬂexibility as long as the task requirements were fulﬁlled.” (Bril
et al., 2010, p. 837). This quotation introduces the third parame-
ter, the Functional parameter, such as kinetic energy,which experts
appear to hold constant and aim to apply the lowest kinetic energy
that is sufﬁcient for the task. As the experiments involved present-
ing participants with hammers of different weights and requiring
them to produce ﬂakes of different sizes, one can assume that all
participants would be able to discern changes in hammerweight or
task demands (in terms of ﬂake size), but the results suggest that a
characteristic of expertise (which was not available to the novices)
was the ability to respond to “nested relationships” (Wagman and
Carello, 2003) between weight of hammer and size of ﬂake to pro-
duce. The ability to appreciate these“nested relationships”allowed
the experts to interpret the constraints placed on them by the
person–environment–tool–object relationships and respond to
these in ways that the novices could not. So, we return to the ques-
tion of where these constraints might be represented? One possi-
bility (implied by Seymour, 1972 and mooted by Bril et al., 2010)
is that the initial representations involve Functional parameters
which are learned and then adapted to changes in context.
In his discussion of dexterity, Bernstein (1967) highlighted that
the main determinant was not bodily movement so much as the
capability to respond to changes in the conditions surrounding
the person. Bernstein’s (1967) notions of tool use, in terms of
dexterity, relate to the quotation from Simon (1969) at the start
of this paper. The manipulation of tools is rarely an end in itself
but is performed with the intention of shaping objects in the envi-
ronment. The actions performed lead to changes in the objects
but also indicate the intentionality of the tool user (providing they
have sufﬁciently dexterity in their use of the tools). The expert tool
user thinks through the tools that are used because the actions per-
formed with the tools shape the environment in such a way as to
solve the problems that it presents and in such a way as to produce
the results that the tool user desires. The action performed with
the tool also creates the opportunities for the next action; and this,
in turn, reﬂects the type of grip and posture which the tool user
adopts. In this way, grip and posture (in holding and using a tool)
indicate the chosen solution to the problem that the tool user is
solving.
In much the same way that Rosenbaum et al. (2012) speaks
of end-state comfort (and the ways in which a posture antici-
pates a particular end-state following the movement), so we can
think of the ways in which the tool user is continually seek-
ing to adapt their current motions in anticipation of subsequent
motions and states of the object. For this paper, we take this to
mean that the skilled tool-user is better able to coordinate the
person–environment–tool–object system and to anticipate how
changes in this system require adaptation of activity. This real-
time adaptation need not imply internal representation of either
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FIGURE 2 | (A) An instrumented handle and (B) using a ﬁle in an instrumented handle to remove paint from a piece of wood.
FIGURE 3 | Example of data collected from experienced silversmith
using a file. The data were sampled at 120 Hz. Velocity is derived from
accelerometer data, de-trended using a moving average of 100 samples
and grip force is the average output from the Analog to Digital
Converter (ADC). The Y velocity line describes anteposterial motion, the
Z velocity line describes vertical displacement, and the top grip
describes the force applied to the top of the handle (pressing down on
to the metal).
task dynamics or some form of “motor program.” Rather, the
expert is able to produce movements which are coordinated to
task goals (being more efﬁcient and economical in terms of energy
use). In a sense, expertise is the practiced adaptation of intrinsic
dynamics to task dynamics (where task dynamics are deﬁned by
the person–environment–tool–object system) so that changes in
task constraints and affordances can be appropriately responded to
through subtle tuning of actions. This implies that experts are able
to modify the pattern of activity without necessarily impairing the
functional impact of the activity. We do not believe that experts
need to possess, or even represent, these various patterns of activ-
ity but rather these arise on-the-ﬂy during the coordinated control
of limbs holding and controlling tools.
STUDIES USING SENSORS FITTED TO THE HANDLES OF
TOOLS
In order to explore these questions of dynamics, we have been
exploring ways in which to capture behavior in the ﬁeld (or, at
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FIGURE 4 | Spectrograms from three participants performing one of
the “paint removal” tasks.The spectrogram of frequencies 0–20 Hz over
time for y -movement (i.e., back and forth motion of the ﬁle across the
wood), moving between the 1st and 3rd dots on the ﬁle with the goal of
removing two layers of paint.
least, in laboratory and workshop settings which are as close to
the ﬁeld as possible). This has involved designing and developing
handles which combine different types of sensor to capture the
actions a person performs. Often such data are collected from
using camera systems with markers on the person. While these
can be very accurate, they are not easy to use in the ﬁeld. Thus,
it makes more sense to instrument the person or their tools in
order to collect data in situ. We have taken the lead from Bril and
her colleagues (discussed in the previous section) to instrument
our tools (Figure 2). In our work, strain gages are used to capture
force applied to the handle and a three-axis accelerometer is used
to capture motion (Parekh and Baber, 2010 for a description of
the design of these handles).
In order to appreciate how experience in using a given tool can
shape activity, Figure 3 presents an extract of recordings (from
a three-axis accelerometer and strain gages integrated into the
handle of a jeweler’s ﬁle) of an experienced silversmith ﬁling the
edge of a metal strip. Figure 3 shows three ﬁling strokes over
the course of 2.5 s. Each stroke (occurring at approximately 11.6,
12, and 12.9 s) is indicated by an increase in the y-velocity data.
There are two types of stroke here: rapid (at 11.6 and 12.9 s) in
which the ﬁle in moved rapidly across the metal, and slow (12 s)
in which the ﬁle is drawn more slowly over the metal. During
each stroke, there is downward pressure on the ﬁle (indicated by
the decrease in z-velocity data and increase in “top grip” force
applied to the top of the handle). Immediately following the
stroke, the ﬁle is lifted up (increase in z-velocity) and brought
back to the starting point. Prior to the next stroke the ﬁle is
adjusted and aligned with the metal (which takes around 1 s),
which involves little change in grip force applied and z-velocity.
The top grip loosens as the ﬁle position is reset for lifting the
ﬁle off the object (movement in the z direction); the expert
user only applies force on the forwards motion. This action is
partly dictated by the ﬁle being used and partly by the results
that the tool user intends. As the expert said, you can remove
metal easily enough but you can’t put it back. So ﬁling is about
removing sufﬁcient (but not too much) of the metal. Further-
more, the metal being worked (copper in this instance) could
easily be dulled if too much of the upper surface was removed,
and so ﬁling was also a matter of retaining the luster of the metal.
Such knowledge can affect the way in which the tool is wielded
and inﬂuence the outcomes that one might expect when using the
tools.
In another study, we asked novice users of a ﬁle to remove paint
from a piece of wood. Figure 2B shows the task being performed.
There are three dots painted on the top of the ﬁle and participant
was instructed to ensure that the ﬁle was kept between the ﬁrst and
second, or the ﬁrst and third dots.
Contrasting three people performing the ﬁling task (Figure 4),
we can see that while the main activity (yellow on the spectro-
graphs) occurs at similar frequencies, the harmonics vary. These
variations might reﬂect differences in strategy. We would expect
to see harmonics from these data due to the periodicity of the
repetitive motions employed. This also suggests that differences
in performance can be captured through a better appreciation
of dynamics and, potentially, following the lead of Bernstein
(1967), can be reﬂected in the conservation of energy of the tool
users.
The raw accelerometer data were integrated to produce veloc-
ity, on which we applied a Fourier transform to determine the
fundamental frequency of the ﬁling motion. Table 1 suggests that
the main determinant of this fundamental frequency is not the
tool-speciﬁc goal to keep the two dots inside the wood, but the
task-speciﬁc goal to remove one or two layers of paint.
CULTURAL AFFORDANCES
In this section, we turn our attention to the broader question of
cultural effects in tool use. For the sake of thediscussion,we restrict
ourselves to the simple assumption that cultural constraints can
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Table 1 | Comparing fundamental frequency of filing for task and tool-directed goals.
Task goal Filing white paint down to show red paint Filing white paint down to show bare wood
Tool-directed goal Keep ﬁle between dot a
and dot b
Keep ﬁle between dot a
and dot c
Keep ﬁle between dot a
and dot b
Keep ﬁle between dot a
and dot c
F0 6.201 Hz 5.518 Hz 3.174 Hz 3.467 Hz
have a bearing of the experiences that people might have with spe-
ciﬁc types of tools and, in particular, can serve to deﬁne acceptable
or proper ways in which particular artifacts are used. Thus, one
question that can be used to address the issue of “culture” in tool
use is to ask how should one properly use cutlery, such as a spoon,
knife or fork?
In their study of eating (kale or water) with a spoon, van der
Kamp and Steenbergen (1999) used video-based motion tracking
to record arm motion. The likelihood of spilling the contents of
the spoon (kale or water) when it was moved from bowl to mouth
increased the number of corrective sub-movements made during
the action which affected the kinematic proﬁle of the movement.
The contents of the spoon also affected head motion. Participants
were more likely to move their head towards the spoon when it
contained water which, in turn, shows how the coordination of the
motion system (i.e., contents–spoon–hand–arm–head) changes in
response to task demands. Interestingly, the study also hinted at
variation in“eating styles”which reﬂected individual differences in
performance. We are interested in how these “eating styles” might
also reﬂect cultural responses to cutlery and how culture deﬁnes
the“proper”way to use an item of cutlery. Of course, the use of the
word “properly” is deliberately provocative and culturally loaded.
At one level, “proper” use could simply mean that food is moved
fromplate tomouth in a controlledmanner, in sufﬁcient quantities
to make it easy to eat. At another level, “proper” use could relate
to various social mores and rules of etiquette in terms of how the
knife and fork are held and moved, and how much food is held on
the fork or put into the mouth. For example, in her discussion of
using forks, Visser (1991) contrasts the “English” style (of eating
from the back of the fork tines and holding the knife in the other
hand) with the “American” style (of eating from the bowl of the
fork and swapping, or “zig-zagging” fork and knife).
We asked participants, using a knife and a fork (ﬁtted to our
instrumented handles), to perform a somewhat unusual version
of “eating.” The task goal required participants to lift a forkful of
sweet-corn to their chin. This breaks down into: “load fork’, “lift
fork’, and “terminate” (e.g., most participants simply tipped the
fork to drop the sweet-corn back onto the plate). The “English”
or “American” styles outlined above are illustrated by Figure 5.
In order to consider variation, we selected one participant who
was familiar with the “English” style (Figure 6) and one of the
participants who had never used cutlery in this manner (Figure 7).
Figures 6 and 7 show that variability in the data from the inex-
perienced user are consistently higher than the experienced user
for both grip and accelerometer data. This echoes the earlier ﬁnd-
ings relating the variability in “skilled” performance. Rather than
the “skill’, in this case, being the result of instruction, training
and practice (as one might expect in the use of hand-tools), these
results hint that enculturation and exposure to particular beliefs
about appropriate use of cutlery can have an impact on the ease
with which these artifacts are manipulated in different ways.
DISCUSSION
We use tools to solve the problems that objects in the environ-
ment present to us. This is an obvious statement but hides a
couple of points which are worth noting. The ﬁrst is that inten-
tion which underlies the use of the tool combines a task goal with
the affordances of the tool–object interface, and the constraints
of the person–environment–tool–object system. This means that
“cognition” becomes the active response to the affordances of the
interaction between tool and object in terms of the task goal that
the user is seeking to achieve. Taking Gibson’s notion of com-
plimentarity, we can say that the dynamic aspect of this activity
continually shapes the actions of the person as much as it shapes
the state of the object. In other words, the states of the object, envi-
ronment, tool, and person become combined to form the focus of
action and, by implication, to help frame and reframe the task
goal. One might expect the task goal to be kept constant during
the performance of the task. However, our discussions with, and
observations of, expert jewelers suggests that this not entirely the
case. While the high-level objective might remain the same (e.g.,
produce a ring of a particular size set with a particular stone), the
development of the “plan” to achieve this goal adapts to the state
of the metal and the performance of the task. Thus, the task goal
would appear to follow the notion of “situated action” (Suchman,
1987) which changes with context. This raises the second point,
that, the focus of action is context-dependent and the context
is continually changing. So, tool use is enactive, embedded and
embodied.
The comparisons of experienced and inexperienced users of
tools (and cutlery) considered in this paper show that expertise
not only involves less variability in physical performance but also
better control of energy expended in the performance of a given
taskwith a given tool.Webelieve that this points to thewell-known
assertion that the expert develops a “feel” for the tool, and often
prefer to use their own tools for particular tasks because these have
become very familiar to them. Indeed, a potential problem that
we face with the instrumented handles that we use is that these
feel different from those that the experienced tool users prefer.
Anecdotally, only the experienced tool users commented on the
feel (weight, balance, material) of these handles during the data
collection.
The skilled craft-worker will often speak of the tool becoming
part of the body, and the feeling of manipulating the tool being
akin to simply moving the hand in which the tool held. For some
writers, this implies that the tool can be considered as a physical
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FIGURE 5 | Comparing English (left) and American (right) cutlery use.
FIGURE 6 | Consistent “English” use (over six separate attempts as
indicated by thick lines between each attempt). The pattern of
grip force applied (particularly to the fork handle) and the
smoothness of the fork’s accelerometer trace show how the
experienced participant’s repetitions are consistent and reﬂect a
well-practiced motion.
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FIGURE 7 |Variable “English” use (over six separate attempts).The
inexperienced participant shows large variation in grip force and
accelerometer trace for the fork. During the task, his preferred approach was
to tilt the fork on its side and move it towards the kernels, using the knife as a
stop. He then held the fork at an angle and used the knife to keep the kernals
pressed to the tines as he lifted both knife and fork. There is less correlation
shown between grip and activity from the knife, which is being pushed on to
the top of the fork, and, particularly towards the right of the graphs, the fork is
held with force primarily only on two sides of the handle as opposed to a full
grip.
extensionof the person and that, therefore,motor control becomes
amatter of adapting to the added potential of the“extended-limb.”
However, rather than simply being amatter of planningmovement
with the addition of the tool, it is plausible to suggest that the
tool changes the perception of space around the tool user (Mar-
avita et al., 2002). “People who use tools. . .build an increasingly rich
implicit understanding of the world in which they use the tools. . .”
[Cutler, 1994, p. 80]. In her discussion of representations in tool-
use, Massen (2013) emphasizes the need to appreciate how tools
become part of the peripersonal space of the user, such that “there
is no need to distinguish between external goal locations to which the
tool has to be moved and the locations to which the bodily effector
has to be moved.” (p. 2). While this makes sense when considering
movements with tools, it overlooks an equally important aspect
of the skilled craft-worker. The reason that the tool feels as if it is
part of the person is because it “disappears” from attention which
becomes more and more focused on the object being worked on.
This suggests that, rather than the tool being an extension of the
body, it makes more sense that the tool creates a focus of atten-
tion – with the sense that the tool’s movement becomes so central
to attention that the control of the limb operating it becomes
less important. This suggests that, rather than considering the
tool-hand combination, it is more important to consider the tool-
object combination because this is where the skilled practitioner is
attending.
The use of tools, by experts, seems to involve anticipatory, feed-
forward control of movement (as well as rapid and efﬁcient use of
feed-back through all of their senses) in which subtle adjustments
in the manipulation of the tool are performed in order to effect
desired changes in the object being worked on. Not only does
this explain the minimal variability but also highlights the central
question of this paper; if so much of the activity of the expert tool
user is anticipatory, how are these anticipations represented? We
propose that it is not sufﬁcient to only look in the brain of the
expert tool user to discover these representations. Even if there are
regions which are active under speciﬁc conditions, the skill of the
expert tool user comes from the ability to control their activity
with sufﬁcient spare capacity to cope with future demands and to
respond to the changing context in which they are using the tools
to effect changes in the object being worked on. The idea that the
environment (and the objects it contains) can be interpreted in
different ways, suggests that these become “external representa-
tions” to which the person responds. Response is partly a matter
of knowledge, skill and ability of the person, partly a matter of
ﬁt between action and environment and partly a matter of the
nature of the environment and the objects it contains. As the per-
son focuses on speciﬁc aspects, which are relevant to the task (of
shaping a piece of metal or arranging tools in aworkspace) so these
aspects become the cognitive space in which subsequent decisions
are made. Tool use, as a form of problem solving, becomes a
matter of making these decisions as the cognitive space changes;
and a means of acting upon the cognitive space to create new
opportunities. This further suggests that much of the activity
which is assumed to be “feed-forward” (in the sense that there
needs to be a model which guides behavior) could be explained by
fast-acting, negative feedback loops (integrated across several sen-
sory modalities) which support moment-by-moment correction
through solving the inverse kinematics problems of positioning a
given tool in a given position in order to effect change in the object
being worked on.
We believe that much of the “representation” drawn upon in
the use of tools can be in the form of external representations (the
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objects and tools in a given environment, particularly in support
of the situated action of ongoing planning in tool use) and in the
form of coordinative structures (the control and management of
physical activity, particularly in terms of feed-forward control of
movement and use of feed-back from the results of the move-
ment). In other words, following the lead of Riccio (1993) and
the more detailed arguments of Chemero (2009) an internal rep-
resentation is not necessary for the control, coordination and (we
propose) planning of tool use because it is sufﬁcient for the tool
user to have the ability to perceive the state of the object on which
she works and to manipulate the tool in order to produce a partic-
ular pattern of perceptions (and, in this case, we suggest that these
patterns are equally as likely to be olfactory, haptic, and auditory
as visual). This ability becomes manifest only during the per-
formance of a person–environment–tool–object system (echoing
Butler’s claim that “strictly speaking, nothing is a tool except dur-
ing use”) and this system can be described using SystemDynamics,
in which the systems goal is the optimization of speciﬁc movement
parameters in order to produce an effect on a given object. This
reduces the need for there to be internal representations per se (see
also Barrett, 2011). Furthermore, any“representation”that the tool
user employs is likely to spread across the entire nervous system
rather than solely in regions of the brain. From this, the strong
and compelling evidence accumulated from the activation of spe-
ciﬁc regions in the brain is taken to indicate the result rather than
the cause of tool using behavior (whether observed, imagined,
or performed) which arises from the recruitment and activation
of coordinative structures (Bernstein, 1967) through task-speciﬁc
devices (Beek and Bingham, 1991). While our paper has not
sought to present evidence in support of this claim, we believe
that this statement helps to bring together the ongoing work that
we have reviewed and raises the opportunity to develop testable
hypotheses for future exploration of the ways in which people
use tools.
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